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starting of the class in "mental obstetrics" and its suppression by the state authorities; the publication of the first three editions of *Science and Health* and the subsequent recensions through J. H. Wiggin as literary adviser; the reconstruction of the "Mother Church" and the exclusion of Mrs. Woodbury, "virgin" mother of the "Prince of Peace"; the tentative adoption of the principle of Mrs. Eddy as feminine incarnation of the deity; and the recent disciplining of Mrs. Stetson. All these data are admirably presented, but the writer's air of astonishment over the Massachusetts Mother's claims to monopolistic inspiration, prophetic gifts, and divine origin, might have been lessened if she had been more familiar with local sectaries.

She treats in an appendix of Mother Ann Lee of New Hampshire, but she draws no parallels between Eddyism and Mormonism, although Joseph Smith as founder of the Latter Day Saints also had his "divine" cures, continuous "revelations", and home-made "key" to the Scriptures.

In fine, this book, though it lacks historic background, nevertheless offers a strangely interesting human document. Mrs. Eddy is more than a personality, she is a type. Given the free field of a democracy she illustrates the possibilities of a shrewd combination of religion, mental medicine, and money. Neurotic yet of indomitable will, illiterate yet of high imaginative power, illogical yet of great business ability, there is here presented the extraordinary spectacle of a career progressing from mean surroundings, through painful invalidism, to successful supremacy.

I. WOODBRIDGE RILEY.

The Life and Letters of James Wolfe. By BECKLES WILLSON.
(London: William Heinemann. 1909. Pp. xiv, 522.)

CONCERNING Wolfe's place in history there has been much discussion. And the question is not solved by this book. Although Mr. Willson has printed a large number of letters in this volume, he does not appear to have the historian's grasp, either of materials or events, to render his work of much service to the serious student. In the preface he asserts that he is fully conscious of the responsibility he has incurred in giving the letters to the world in an unabridged form—that Wolfe is thereby exposed to "the misapprehensions and the censure of minds little accustomed to appraise genius". When Wolfe's letters to Rickson were published in 1849, the editor omitted passages therefrom fearing that the free style of the writer might give offense. An examination of the original letters in Edinburgh was sufficient to show that nothing had been gained by the suppression. Nor do we think that "the censure of those little accustomed to appraise genius" would have been an adequate excuse on the part of the present editor for a wholesale expurgation of the correspondence. "Litera scripta manet", writes Mr. Willson; but to him the words convey a strange meaning, since in the

examples we shall cite not only essential portions of letters but their distinguishing characteristics have disappeared without any indication of the fact to the reader. Thus in the letter to Rickson, dated December 1, 1758, the text of the original in Edinburgh differs materially from the version presented by Mr. Willson on page 402, *e. g.*, besides changes in punctuation and spelling, "were" is changed to "are", "the defeat" to "this defeat". The sentence "uncommon diligence and activity and unparallel'd Batoe Knowledge", is replaced by merely two words, "bat-tue knowledge", and thirty-three words at the end of the letter are omitted.

Another instance on page 446 may be cited as an example of the author's carelessness. "On July 5 Wolfe issued the following orders—Camp at the Island of Orleans. The object of the campaign", etc. In the original order there are nearly one hundred words before the paragraph with which Mr. Willson begins his quotation, and in the second paragraph a sentence is left out.

One object before Mr. Willson in writing this book was "to clarify the account of the Quebec campaign". His efforts have been singularly unfortunate. The clarifying process begins on page 421. In the first line there is a mistake. "Wolfe, when he sailed from Spit-head on the 14th of February", etc. According to the log of the *Neptune*, which we accept as a more reliable authority, Wolfe sailed on the 17th. In order to show the importance of the army commanded by Wolfe over the navy commanded by Saunders, Mr. Willson considers "it is as well to understand at the outset just what the Admiral's place and functions were in the Quebec expedition." "Chatham's instructions to Amherst show that he attached the chief value to the army commanded by Wolfe, and that Admiral Saunders was merely to co-operate with Wolfe" (p. 422). Saunders, however, according to the author, had other designs from the moment he sailed, for "when an order came for Saunders from Chatham" to detach the *Stirling Castle*, the crafty admiral substituted another vessel as she "was handy for rivers", thus showing "that he then expected to sail up the St. Lawrence and actually second Wolfe, and not merely cover Wolfe's army and keep control of the communications".

It was the obvious duty of Saunders to second Wolfe's efforts and to co-operate with him. The secret instructions of the king to Wolfe dated February 5, 1759, are very clear on this point. There was no question in the mind of either the king, of "Chatham", of Amherst, or of Saunders as to the superiority of either arm of the service in the campaign. Quebec was to be attacked and reduced by the United Service, and it would have been impossible for either arm to have accomplished it alone.

After having shown, on page 422, that the duty of Saunders was to cover Wolfe's army and not to second his efforts, Mr. Willson makes the extraordinary statement on page 435, "Although the situation was

not fortunate in one respect, in another it was more than Wolfe had ever dared expect. He had won Saunders over to a co-operation between sea and land forces as perfect as it could be, more perfect than it had ever been in any previous expedition. The Admiral's thoughts and resources were not to be primarily (as Wolfe had once feared) with Halifax and Louisbourg, to cover the rear of the army, but he and his ships were to be at the General's right hand. . . . Saunders, too, it appeared, was a fighting man, and agreed to accompany Wolfe with his entire battle squadron to the walls of the fortress which Wolfe meant should be taken." Why it should be necessary for Wolfe to persuade the admiral to do something which he was instructed to do, and had, according to Mr. Willson, expressed the intention of doing (p. 422), we are left in ignorance.

On page 435 the author attempts to make a point out of an intercepted despatch from Amherst delivered by Bougainville to Montcalm. "But for the timely information Montcalm thus received he would have been unable to make his preparations, and Wolfe, instead of the long and dreary task before him, might have fallen on the enemy's weak point and won victory in July instead of September."

It is exceedingly doubtful whether the despatch had much influence on Montcalm's action. Bougainville did not arrive in Quebec until May 10, and before the missive was in the hands of Montcalm, then in Montreal, a courier was hastening to Quebec with the alarming intelligence that fourteen ships were in the St. Lawrence within forty leagues of Quebec. These were the ships of Durell. It was the reception of these tidings that spurred Montcalm to the task of fortifying the Beauport heights.

Before Wolfe sailed from England he had in his possession an excellent plan of Quebec and a detailed account of the defensive works of the city which had been prepared for him the year before by Major Mackellar from personal observation. Nevertheless, he found the situation different from what he expected. He had written a short time before his arrival at Quebec that he expected to attack the French position at the mouth of the St. Charles River, but a single glance at the heights of Beauport must have convinced him of the impracticability of such an attempt. No one would accuse Wolfe of want of boldness, but one would hesitate to impute to him the madness suggested by this paragraph (p. 445): "The safety of the fleet depended upon the strength of Pointe d'Orleans and Point Lévis; but it was from a third point that Wolfe was resolved to make his chief onset. This was Beauport. . . . Wolfe thus laid himself open to the charge of splitting up his small force." Beauport was the centre of the French camp, the headquarters of Montcalm. It was from Montmorency and not from Beauport that Wolfe resolved to make the attack. Referring to the disaster at Montmorency (p. 463), the author quotes the passage from a secondary authority: "This failure caused a temporary abatement of the enthusi-

astic regard in which Wolfe was held by officers and soldiers alike.' There is nothing whatever to justify such an assertion. Wolfe's general orders sufficiently explained the cause of the disaster to all. The Grenadiers were alone to blame." It is not necessary to cite any secondary source in support of the assertion. James Gibson, writing to Governor Lawrence on the day after the event, uses these words: "The number of the wounded, more particularly officers, made it necessary for them to retreat, which they did as regularly and soldier-like as they advanced, at least we generally think so here, notwithstanding the cruel aspersion the inclosed paper threw on them 2 days after the action, and which disgusted every man who was an eye-witness of such gallantry as, perhaps, is not to be paralleled. . . . The attempt was, I had said, impracticable, which some general officers scarcely hesitated to say, one of them of Knowledge, Fortune and Interest, I have heard has said that the attack *then* and *there* was contrary to the advice and opinion of every officer, and when things come to this you'll judge what the event may be!" These are not the utterances of men who have confidence in their leader.

The Grenadiers blundered it is true; but it was a hazardous plan which depended upon the successful working of many combinations. "In none of these circumstances", to quote the words of Wolfe, "the essential matter resides. The great fault of that day consists in putting too many men into the boats, who might have been landed the day before, and might have crossed the falls with certainty, while a small body only remained to float; and the superfluous boats of the fleet employed in a feint that might divide the enemy's force. A man sees his error often too late to remedy it."

Instances might be multiplied of gross carelessness, and we do not consider that Mr. Willson has rendered any service to history in his attempts to clarify the account of the Quebec campaign. Until we have an opportunity to collate other letters of Wolfe we hesitate to offer any further opinion on his merit in the capacity of an editor.

Porfirio Diaz, President of Mexico: the Master Builder of a Great Commonwealth. By JOSÉ F. GODOY. (New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1910. Pp. xii, 253.)

THE author of this book has been connected with the diplomatic service of Mexico for many years and is now filling the post of minister to Cuba. By his foreign residence and training he has been well prepared to write a dispassionate biography of his great countryman. While his work is well done, it is plain that his narrative has been written under the limitations of his official position.

He adheres very closely to his subject, *The Master Builder of a Great Commonwealth*. Only four pages are devoted to his parentage, youth, and education, and in the compass of about twenty pages he covers the entire period of General Diaz's services in the important